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This paper asks: what are the democratic potentials of the digital commons and the 
digital public sphere? First, the article identifies ten problems of digital  capitalism. 
Second, it engages with the notion of the digital public sphere. Third, it outlines 
the concept of the digital commons. Fourth, some conclusions are drawn and ten 
suggestions for advancing digital democracy are presented.
This article contributes to theorising and the analysis of digital capitalism, 
Internet platforms, the digital public sphere, the digital commons, digital democ-
racy, public service Internet platforms, civil society/community Internet platforms, 
platform cooperatives, open access, corporate/capitalist open access, and diamond 
open access. This work also outlines ten problems of digital capitalism as well as 
ten principles of digital progressivism, a politics that advances the public sphere 
and the commons and thereby (digital) democracy in society.
There are natural, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of the commons 
and the digital commons. Capitalism, public service, and civil society media/com-
munity media/cooperatives are three forms of organisation and governing the 
Internet and digital media/technologies. Capitalism colonises and commodifies the 
(digital) commons and the (digital) public sphere. Alternative models are located 
outside of capitalism in the realms of the public sphere and civil society as well as 
their interactions.
Keywords: digital commons; digital public sphere; digital capitalism; public 
 service media; public service Internet platforms; platform co-operatives; platform 
 cooperativism
Introduction
In the past 15 years, the notions of big data and social media have become prevalent in 
everyday life. Associated with it, we have experienced the rise of platforms such as Google, 
YouTube, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Apple, Baidu, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, Alibaba, 
Spotify, and Netflix. These platforms gather lots of personal user data and provide services 
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such as search engines, video platforms, social networks, online shop microblogs, photo-shar-
ing platforms, messenger apps, or music and film streaming.
This paper asks: What are the democratic potentials of the digital commons and the digi-
tal public sphere? First, the article identifies ten problems of digital capitalism. Second, it 
engages with the notion of the digital public sphere. Third, it outlines the concept of the 
digital commons. Fourth, some conclusions are drawn and ten suggestions for advancing 
digital democracy are presented.
Digital capitalism
Capitalism is a type of society that is based on the logic of the accumulation of power 
(Fuchs, 2020a). Money capital is a particular and important form of power that is accumu-
lated in capitalist society. But the logic of accumulation also shapes politics and culture. 
Politics in capitalist society is the sphere of the accumulation of decision-power. Culture in 
capitalist society is the sphere of the accumulation of reputation. Inequality and injustices 
are the consequences of the logic of accumulation: the capitalist economy is shaped by the 
exploitation of labour and the asymmetric distribution of wealth; the capitalist political sys-
tem is shaped by domination and asymmetrical influence; the capitalist cultural system is 
shaped by ideology, malrecognition, and disrespect.
Digital capitalism is not a new phase of capitalist development, but rather a dimension of 
the organisation of capitalism that is shaped by digital mediation. In digital capitalism, social 
processes such as the accumulation of power, capital accumulation, class struggles, politi-
cal struggles, hegemony, ideology, commodification, or globalisation, are mediated by digital 
technologies, digital information, and digital communication. Transnational digital and com-
munication corporations play an important role in digital capitalism.
Twenty-one of the world’s largest 100 transnational corporations operate in the commu-
nication, media and digital industry (Table 1). Subsectors of the capitalist communication, 
media and digital industry include, for example, advertising, broadcast networks, cloud stor-
age, communication/digital networks, digital games, digital hardware, digital services and 
platforms, leisure and live entertainment culture, online shopping, online streaming, or 
software. The total profits of the dominant 21 communication/digital/media corporations 
amounted in financial year 2019 to USS$ 2.5 trillion, which made up 3% of the global 2019 
gross domestic product.1 That just 21 companies control 3% of the world’s financial wealth 
produced during one year shows the large power of capitalist companies, including digital 
and communication corporations.
Table 1: The dominant transnational communication and digital corporations.








9 Apple USA digital hardware, software, digital ser-
vices, online streaming, cloud storage
267.7 57.2
11 AT&T USA communication/digital networks, 
broadcasting networks
179.2 14.4
13 Alphabet USA digital advertising, digital services 
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South Korea digital hardware 197.6 18.4
20 Verizon 
Communications
USA communication/digital networks 131.4 18.4
22 Amazon USA online shopping platform, online 
streaming of digital content, cloud 
storage
296.3 10.6
27 Comcast USA communication/digital networks, 
broadcast networks
108.7 11.7
28 China Mobile China communication/digital networks 108.1 15.5
31 Alibaba China online shopping platforms, online 
payment, online entertainment 
streaming
70.6 24.7
36 Walt Disney USA entertainment content, broadcast 
networks, digital entertainment 
and streaming platforms, leisure 
parks, merchandising
74.8 10.4
38 Intel USA digital hardware 75.7 22.7





Japan communication/digital networks 109.6 7.9
50 Tencent China digital advertising, digital services 
(QQ, WeChat), digital games, music 
and video streaming, 
54.6 13.5
51 IBM USA digital hardware, software, cloud 
computing
76.5 9.0
58 Sony Japan hardware, video games, 
 entertainment content
79.2 6





Germany communication/digital networks 90.1 4.3
82 Cisco Systems USA digital hardware, software 51.6 11.1
94 Oracle USA digital hardware, software 39.8 10.8
Total: 2,477.2 367.0
Source: Forbes 2000 List (year 2020). Available at: www.forbes.com/global2000 (last accessed 7 
October 2020).
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Digital capitalism has been shaped by ten major societal problems (see Fuchs, 2021: 
 especially chapter 14):
1. Communication and digital capital exploits communication and digital labour and has 
resulted in the tendency of capitalist monopolies in the communication and digital 
industry.
2. Dominant Internet culture is shaped by a competitive, individualistic digital culture that 
is me-centred and focused on the accumulation and asymmetric distribution of online 
attention, influence, reputation, visibility, and voice.
3. Communication/digital corporations and state apparatuses have created a surveillance-
industrial complex.
4. Capitalist social media are anti-social media that have helped in advancing anti- 
democratic potentials, digital authoritarianism, digital racism, digital nationalism, and 
digital fascism.
5. In algorithmic politics, algorithms create online content and attention, and it becomes 
difficult for humans to discern which online activities are human and which ones are 
machinic.
6. In the online world, there are fragmented digital public spheres where we find filter 
bubbles.
7. The digital culture industry has created digital ideology, ideologies about the digital 
and ideology disseminated via digital networks. Digital advertising and tabloid content 
dominate the online world. Many digital platforms are digital tabloids.
8. Influencer capitalism dominates social media and has created asymmetric attention, 
reputation, and visibility on the Internet as well as an ideological culture dominated by 
shopping and advertising. Advertising is increasingly hidden and presented as regular 
content (‘branded content’). ‘Influencer capitalism is not a type of capitalism but an 
ideology that claims that by being active on social media platforms such as Instagram, 
Snapchat, and YouTube there are great opportunities for becoming wealthy and famous. 
Influencer capitalism is the dream, fantasy, and desire of users to become celebrities 
that accumulate a wealth of social relations, money, influence, likes, positive comments, 
etc. Influencer capitalism is the online manifestation of the American Dream’s ideo-
logical claim that in capitalism everyone has an equal opportunity to make a career, 
from a dishwasher to a billionaire, by having a good idea and believing in themselves’ 
(Fuchs, 2021: 175).
9. The high amount of online information flows processed at high speed has resulted in 
digital acceleration. There is a lack of time and space for sustained political debate.
10. On social media, one frequently encounters fake/false news and post-factual politics 
that deny facts and are led by emotionalisation, tabloidisation, and ideology.
The combined consequences of these ten developments are that democracy is under threat 
and we have experienced the rise of authoritarian capitalism where far-right demagogues 
dominate politics (Fuchs, 2018a, 2020b). Digitalisation is not the cause of these develop-
ments, but has rather mediated the antagonism between neoliberal capitalism and rising 
social inequalities. The commodification, privatisation, commercialisation, and individualisa-
tion of (almost) everything has turned against liberalism’s civic values and political freedoms, 
which has given rise to new nationalist, racist, xenophobic, authoritarian, and fascist forces 
in society.
The question arises: What the alternatives are to digital capitalism and digital authoritari-
anism? Are the digital public sphere and the digital commons such alternatives?
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The digital public sphere
Political communication is an important and indispensable aspect of the political system in 
all models of democracy. In general terms, it can be said that the public is a central mecha-
nism of the political system. By ‘public’ we generally understand goods and spaces that are 
‘open to all’ (Habermas, 1989: 1). One speaks, for example, of public education, public build-
ings, public parks, public squares, public assemblies, public demonstrations, public opinion, 
public media, etc. Public goods and facilities are not reserved for a clique or a club of the 
privileged, but are intended for the general public, i.e. all members of society.
The public sphere is a sphere of public political communication that mediates between the 
other subsystems of society, namely the economy, politics, culture, and private life. The ideal 
type of the public sphere is a realm of society that organises ‘critical publicity’ (Habermas, 
1989: 237) and ‘critical public debate’ (Habermas, 1989: 52). The public sphere mediatises 
political communication. It is a mediatising space of political communication in which 
 citizens meet, who inform themselves about life in society, and communicate politically. The 
public sphere is a space where political opinions are formed. Public communication is an 
important aspect of the existence of humans as social beings and of society. In modern soci-
ety, the media system is the most important organised form of public communication. In the 
media system, media actors produce public information. There is a number of criticisms of 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, mainly from the field of postmodern studies. The 
present author has in other places criticised the dismissal of Habermas and the public sphere 
concept and argues that Habermas’ concept is useful in and can be updated to the digital age 
(see Fuchs, 2014b).
The digital public sphere is not a separate sphere of society, but a dimension and aspect 
of the public sphere in societies where digital information and digital communication are 
prevalent. The digital public sphere means the publishing of information, critical publicity, 
and critical public debate mediated by digital information and communication technologies. 
Not all information and communication via the Internet, mobile phones, and tablets is part 
of the digital public sphere. When processes of commodification and capitalisation (the logic 
of economic accumulation), domination (the logic of political accumulation), and ideology 
(the logic of political accumulation) shape digital practices, the latter do not form a public 
sphere. The digital public sphere has then, as Habermas (1989) argues, been colonised and 
feudalised. We can then speak of an alienated digital sphere and alienated communication 
but not of a digital public sphere. The ten processes outlined in the previous section are 
manifestations of digital alienation, digital colonisation, and digital feudalisation.
The mentioned ten tendencies lead overall to a digital sphere that is characterised and 
divided by economic, political, and cultural power asymmetries. The logics of accumulation, 
advertising, monopolisation, commercialisation, commodification, acceleration, individual-
ism, fragmentation, automation of human activity, surveillance, and ideologisation turn the 
digital public sphere into a colonised and feudalised sphere, a pseudo-digital public sphere 
that is public in appearance only. In digital capitalism, commercial culture dominates the 
Internet and social media. Platforms are largely owned by profit-oriented corporations. Public 
service media operate on the basis of a different logic. However, the idea of a public Internet 
has not yet been able to establish itself and sounds strange to most ears, as there are hardly 
any alternatives to the commercial Internet today.
Public service media are media of, in and operating through the public sphere. The commu-
nication scholar Slavko Splichal (2007: 255) gives a precise definition of public service media:
In normative terms, public service media must be a service of the public, by the public, 
and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed by it and should be 
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owned by it. It ought to be a service by the public – not only financed and controlled, 
but also produced by it. It must be a service for the public – but also for the gov-
ernment and other powers acting in the public sphere. In sum, public service media 
ought to become ‘a cornerstone of democracy’.
The means of production of public service media are publicly owned. The production and 
circulation of content is based on a non-profit-making logic and the public service media 
remit. Access is universal, as all citizens are given easy access to the content and technologies 
of public service media. In political terms, public service media offer diverse and inclusive 
content that promotes political understanding and discourse. In cultural terms, they offer 
educational content that contributes to the cultural development of individuals and society. 
Public service media have a special, legally defined remit, namely that they have to produce 
and provide content and services that help to advance democracy, education, and culture. In 
debates, public service media such as the BBC are often incorrectly presented as state media 
or state-controlled media. True public service media are legally enabled by the state (licence 
fee funding, public service remit), but not controlled by the state. Public service media are 
independent media organisations that are enabled by state laws.
Due to the special qualities of public service media, they can also make a particularly valu-
able democratic and educational contribution to a democratic online public sphere and digi-
tal democracy if they are given the necessary material and legal means to do so.
Life in modern society has increasingly been accelerated, which includes the accelera-
tion of the economy, political decision-making, lifestyles, and experiences (Fuchs, 2014a; 
Rosa, 2013). The logic of accumulation is the driving force of acceleration (see Fuchs, 2014a). 
As a consequence, the speed of social relations has been increased, especially since the rise 
of neoliberal capitalism. In the realm of the media, the acceleration of information flows has 
been an aspect of the tabloidisation of media and communication that in turn is an aspect of 
the commercialisation, monopolisation, and commodification of the media.
The predominant media are high-speed spectacles that are superficial and characterised 
by a lack of time provided for debate. They erode the public sphere and the culture of politi-
cal discussion. They leave no time or space to citizens for grasping the complexity of society 
and for developing arguments. What we need today is the decommodification and decelera-
tion of the media. We need slow media (see Fuchs, 2021; Köhler, David and Blumtritt, 2010; 
Rauch, 2018).
What is slow media?
Slow media takes the speed out of information, news, and political communication by reduc-
ing the amount of information and communication flows. Users engage more deeply with 
each other and with content. Slow media does not distract users with advertisements, it is not 
based on user surveillance, and it is not undertaken to yield profit. It is not simply a different 
form of media consumption, but an alternative way of organising and doing media – a space 
for reflection and rational political debate. (Fuchs, 2021: 363)
Slow media and slow political communication are not new. Club 2 in Austria and After 
Dark in the UK are prototypical examples. The journalists Kuno Knöbl and Franz Kreuzer 
designed the Club 2 concept for the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF). It was a 
discussion programme that was usually broadcast on Tuesday and Thursday. The first pro-
gramme was broadcast on 5 October 1976, the last on 28 February 1995. 1,400 programmes 
were broadcast on ORF (Der Standard, 2001). Club 2 had a new edition that was broadcast 
from 2007 to 2012. However, a different concept was used that did not adhere to the origi-
nal principles.
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In the UK, the media production company Open Media created a similar format based 
on Club 2 under the name After Dark. After Dark was broadcast once a week on Channel 4 
between 1987 and 1991 and occasionally thereafter. In 2003, After Dark was shown for a 
short time on BBC.
The producer of After Dark, Sebastian Cody, describes the Club 2/After Dark concept as 
follows:
Namely, the number of participants in these intimate debates (always conducted in 
agreeable surroundings and without an audience) was never less than four, never 
more than eight (like, as it happens, group therapy); the discussion should be hosted 
by a non-expert, whose job rotates, thus eliminating the cult of personality otherwise 
attaching to presenters; the participants should be a diverse assortment, all directly 
involved in the subject under discussion that week; and, most importantly, the pro-
gramme was to be transmitted live and be open-ended. The conversation finishes 
when the guests decide, not when TV people make them stop. (Cody, 2008)
The concept of Club 2 sounds rather unusual to many people today, as we are so used to 
formats with short duration, high speed and the lack of time in the media and our daily lives. 
Open, uncensored, controversial, live discussions that appeal to the viewer and the audience 
are different from accelerated media in terms of space and time: Club 2 was a public space 
where guests met and discussed with each other in an atmosphere that offered unlimited 
time, which was experienced publicly and during which a socially important topic was dis-
cussed. Club 2 was a democratic public space in public broadcasting.
Space and time are two important dimensions of the public political economy. However, 
a social space that offers enough time for discussion is not yet a guarantee for a committed, 
critical, and dialectical discussion that transcends one-dimensionality, penetrates into the 
depths of a topic and highlights the similarities and differences of different positions. Public 
space and time must be organised and managed in an intelligent way, so that the right people 
participate, the atmosphere is appropriate, the right discussion questions are asked, and it is 
ensured that all guests have their say, listen to each other, and that the discussion can pro-
ceed undisturbed, etc. Unlimited space, a dialectically controversial and intellectually chal-
lenging space, and intelligent organisation are three important aspects of publicity. These 
are preconditions of slow media, non-commercial media, decolonised media, and media of 
public interest.
We need slow media. Online and offline. Let us decelerate the media and create slow media 
2.0. Is a new version of Club 2 (Club 2.0) as part of the digital public sphere possible today?
Club 2.0 is an example of a public service Internet platform that helps advancing demo-
cratic communication and the digital public sphere. In Club 2.0, the traditional principles of 
Club 2 are practised and updated (see Figure 1). There is a controversial live studio debate 
without time limit. It is broadcast on television and also on a public service video platform, 
a public service version of YouTube. Social media enable user-generated content and online 
debate. An updated version of Club 2 should make use of the affordances of digital media: 
in Club 2.0, users can upload discussion inputs and discussed in text- and video-based for-
mats on the public service YouTube channel that accompanies the Club 2.0 television broad-
casts. At certain points of time of the TV debate, single user-generated video discussion 
inputs are selected and broadcast as part of the television discussion so that they inform the 
studio debate.
Club 2.0 is an expression of digital democracy and the digital public sphere. It manifests a 
combination of elements of deliberative and participatory democracy. Deliberative democracy 
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creates ‘institutional designs of modern democracy’ that are based on the ‘principle of reci-
procity’ (Held, 2006: 233). It enables ‘social encounters which take account of the point of 
view of others – the moral point of view’ (Held, 2006: 233), places ‘greater emphasis upon 
those settings and the procedures of preference formation and learning within politics 
and civil society’ (Held, 2006: 233) and the ‘giving of defensible reasons, explanations and 
accounts for public decisions’ (Held, 2006: 237). It stresses the communicative dimension of 
democracy and that ‘[c]ritical reflection must link up with public debate and deliberative poli-
tics’ (Held, 2006: 241). Club 2.0 is a communicative mechanism that allows more reflection, 
explanation, and debate in politics and can thereby strengthen deliberative aspects of democ-
racy. Participatory democracy stresses ‘[d]irect participation of citizens in the regulation of the 
key institutions of society, including the workplace and local community’ (Held, 2006: 215). 
Club 2.0 increases participation of citizens in culture and political debate. It is a participatory 
aspect of culture and politics. Club 2.0 offers space and time for controversial political com-
munication and enables citizens to participate in the discussion collectively and individually 
through videos and commentaries. Club 2.0 brings together the communicative aspect of 
deliberative democracy and the participatory idea of grassroots democracy. The digital public 
sphere and public service Internet platforms are social phenomena that are opposed to and 
challenge digital capitalism and the capitalist Internet.
The digital commons
Elinor Ostrom, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2009, defines the 
commons with a theory of economic goods that is based on the two features of exclusion 
and subtractability. For Ostrom, common-pool resources have high subtractability and low 
exclusivity (Hess and Ostrom, 2007: 9). An example is a library with open accessibility: it has 
a low entry barrier (low exclusivity) and high subtractability (it becomes unusable if too many 
humans use it at once). In contrast, she argues that a sunset is a public good because it is 
non-rivalrous in consumption (low subtractability) and it is difficult to exclude someone from 
sunshine and watching the sunset (low exclusivity).
Figure 1: Club 2.0. Source: First published as CC in Fuchs (2018b: 74).
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The problem with Ostrom’s concept is that it neglects political economy, i.e. the concept 
of common ownership. Ostrom thereby de-politicises the concept of the commons. Yochai 
Benkler argues that influenced by Ostrom’s works, ‘a more narrowly defined literature devel-
oped’ (Benkler, 2006: 480). Benkler argues for ‘an entirely different theory of the commons’ 
(Benkler, 2013: 1510). He defines the commons in the following way:
Commons are an alternative form of institutional space, where human agents can 
act free of the particular constraints required for markets, and where they have 
some degree of confidence that the resources they need for their plans will be 
available to them. Both freedom of action and security of resource availability 
are achieved in very different patterns than they are in property-based markets. 
( Benkler, 2006: 144).
For Benkler, the commons are non-market and non-profit-based resources that are available 
to everyone (for another definition, see Bauwens, Kostakis and Pazaitis, 2019: 3). Slavoj Žižek 
(2010, 212–13) identifies three forms of the commons:
• the cultural commons: language, means of communication, education, infrastructures;
• the commons of external nature: the natural environment;
• the commons of internal nature: the human being.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2017: 166) identify two basic forms of the commons, 
namely the social and the natural commons. They subdivide these two types into five kinds 
of the commons:
• the natural commons: ecosystems, the earth;
• the social commons 1: codes, ideas, images, cultural products;
• the social commons 2: physical products commonly produced by cooperative work;
• the social commons 3: rural and metropolitan spaces where human communicate, coop-
erate and interact culturally;
• the social commons 4: institutions that provide health care, education, housing, and 
 welfare for all.
Karl Marx stressed that there are resources in society that are produced in a collective and 
cooperative manner. He argues that universal work creates common goods that are ‘brought 
about partly by the cooperation of men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work’ 
and involve the ‘direct cooperation of individuals’ (Marx, 1894: 199). Commons are resources 
that are collectively owned and that are reproduced in a cooperative manner. The natural 
commons are resources produced by nature that are required for all humans to survive. It 
includes the earth and the universe as the natural habitat of humans. Nature constantly pro-
duces and reproduces itself. It is a self-organising system. Nature as such is by its own nature 
a common good because when it produces itself it is available to everyone.
But historically, capital expropriated and enclosed parts of nature so that they became 
 private property. In the middle ages, humans used the land, the forests, the fields, the 
 meadows, etc. as common goods. The formation of capitalism involved what Marx (1867: 
part 8) terms original primitive accumulation, the violent transformation of humans into 
wage-labourers. One measure was the legal enclosure of the natural commons so that land 
became private property. Peasants were driven from the land and henceforth had to earn a 
living as wage-workers.
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Socially produced goods are commons when they are collectively owned and cooperatively 
produced. There is an important moral–political principle underlying Marx and Engels’s 
thought and politics: those who produce the goods should collectively own them. For Marx 
and Engels, the central characteristic of a communist society is that there is common owner-
ship of the means of production by the workers:
In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: 
Abolition of private property. […] When, therefore, capital is converted into common 
property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby 
transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is 
changed. It loses its class character. (Marx and Engels, 1848: 498, 499)
According to Marx and Engels, the commons are not goods that have certain features as 
assumed in the theory of economic goods. Rather, any good can be transformed into collec-
tive ownership. They argue that the means of production should be common goods. A key 
feature of neoliberal capitalism has been the transformation of common goods into private 
property and commodities as part of the process that David Harvey (2005: 165–72) calls the 
commodification of everything. Commodification is an economic process that destroys the 
material foundations of the commons. It turns something that is available and accessible 
to all and benefiting all into a private property controlled and traded on markets. Utman 
(2020) points out that in the realm of communication, neoliberal capitalism has resulted in 
the expropriation of voice as a common resource and practice and has thereby undermined 
democracy. Based on a model of society, Table 2 identifies four types and dimension of the 
commons.
Euler (2018) stresses that there is a structural and a practice dimension of the common. 
‘Commoning can be considered the social practices that make commons what they are. […] 
commons is the social form of (tangible and/or intangible) matter that is determined by 
commoning’ (Euler, 2018: 12). In capitalism, the commons can only exist as seeds of a com-
mons society (Euler, 2018: 12). Antonis Broumas (2020, 11–14) points out the commons’ 
dialectic of resource and community. Given that the commons are not just resources, but 
Table 2: Four types and dimensions of the commons.
Sphere of 
society
Type of the commons Meaning of the commons
nature natural commons: 
 environmental sustainability
common access to natural resources for everyone, 
common use of natural resources in environmen-
tally sustainable manners
economy economic commons: socialism common ownership of the means of production
politics political commons: participatory 
democracy
humans who are affected by certain phenomena can 
take collective decisions about these affairs, basic 
political rights are guaranteed for all and commonly 
respect
culture cultural commons: culture of 
friendship
all humans are respected and they are able to 
understand each other and live together through 
common practices in everyday life so that friend-
ships and a unity of diversity of lifestyles, identities, 
and  communities are possible
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common resources embedded into practices of commoning and commons communities 
(Papadimitropoulos, 2020: chapter 1), there is a ‘distinctive communicative element’ of com-
moning (Utman, 2020: 158).
The digital commons are digital resources that are commonly controlled by humans. 
Table 3 presents four types and dimension of the digital commons.
At the level of digital infrastructures, community networks run as cooperatives are exam-
ples of a digital commons projects. At the level of software and digital content, free software 
and non-commercial Creative Commons licences are examples of digital commons projects. 
Free/libre and open source software (FLOSS) has postcapitalist potentials, but has also in 
various forms been subsumed under capital (see Berlinguer, 2020; Birkinbine, 2020). At the 
level of digital platforms, platform cooperatives are examples of digital commons projects. 
Platform cooperatives are not-for-profit Internet platforms that are collectively owned and 
governed by the digital workers who produce the resources that underpin these platforms 
(see Sandoval, 2020; Scholz, 2016, 2017; Scholz and Schneider, 2016). Examples of platform 
coops are the music platform Resonate (an alternative to Spotify, https://resonate.is), Fairbnb 
(an alternative to Airbnb, https://fairbnb.coop), Taxiapp (an alternative to Uber), the pho-
tography and video platform Stocksy (an alternative to Shutterstock and iStockPhoto, www.
stocksy.com), or the collaboration platform Loomio (www.loomio.org).
Cooperatives in the realm of the digital economy advance the economic commons and the 
political commons because they are non-profit organisations that are collectively governed 
and controlled. They are not the only digital commons project. For example, public service 
Internet projects advance the economic commons as they are owned by the public and the 
political and cultural commons as they are based on public service remits. Digital commons 
projects do not automatically advance all levels of the commons. For example, community 
networks do not necessarily reduce e-waste and energy consumption (environmental sus-
tainability). Some aspects of the commons are per definition covered by digital commons 
projects, whereas others are only achieved by active commitment beyond the foundation of 
particular projects.
Open access publishing has emerged as a response to the monopoly practices of  capitalist 
publishers. Open access journals and publishing houses very frequently use Creative 
Table 3: Four types and dimension of the digital commons.
Sphere of 
society
Type of the digital commons Meaning of the digital commons
nature natural digital commons: digital 
environmental sustainability
common control of the mines where natural 
resources are extracted that form the physical 
foundations of digital technologies, sustainable 
environmental impacts of digital technologies 
that guarantee the common survival of nature, 
humans and society (e.g. green computing)
economy economic digital commons: digital 
socialism
common ownership of the digital means of 
production
politics political digital common: 
 participatory digital democracy
collective governance of decisions about the use 
of digital resource
culture cultural digital commons: digital 
friendships
unity in diversity and common recognition and 
respect of everyone in digitally mediated commu-
nities so that friendships are enabled
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Commons licences, which make the content of published works a digital common in the 
sense that it is a common good that can be accessed by anyone and isn’t the exclusive pri-
vate property of someone but a form of knowledge that is provided to humanity as a gratis 
resource. On 28 February 2021, 15,989 open access journals were listed in the Directory of 
Open Access Journals (https://doaj.org).
But open access is not automatically a true digital common that is a manifestation of all 
four forms of the digital commons identified in Table 3. Capitalist open access publishers 
have subsumed open access under capital (see Knoche, 2020). These are for-profit open access 
publishers that accumulate capital. The capital accumulation strategy they employ most fre-
quently is that they charge high fees to authors that do not just cover production costs but 
also yield profits that are privately owned. In capitalist open access, digital content is de-com-
modified, i.e. the articles and books are published as Creative Commons, but the principles of 
capital accumulation, commodification, valorisation, and profitability are not given up, but 
transformed. The opportunity to get published is commodified while the published content 
is a commons. The digital commons thereby are subsumed under and colonised by digital 
capital. Capitalist open access is a digital capitalism of the commons. ‘In the Corporate Open 
Access Model, companies, organizations or networks publish material online in a digital ver-
sion, do so free of charge for the readers, but derive monetary profits with strategies such as 
charging authors or selling advertising space’ (Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013: 438).
Commons licences should focus on advancing not-for-profit projects that are seeds of post-
capitalism. Commons licences such as Creative Commons are not automatically critical of 
capitalism; some of them are compatible with, subsumed under, and supportive of capital-
ism. In contrast, diamond open access projects are true digital commons projects that have a 
non-capitalist character. Diamond open access is,
a form of non-profit academic publishing that makes academic knowledge a com-
mon good, reclaims the common character of the academic system and entails the 
possibility of fostering job security by creating public service publishing jobs. […] In 
the Diamond Open Access Model, not-for-profit, non-commercial organizations, associa-
tions or networks publish material that is made available online in digital format, is free 
of charge for readers and authors and does not allow commercial and for-profit re-use. 
(Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013: 428, 438; emphasis original)
Radical Open Access is a network of diamond open access projects that,
promote a progressive vision for open publishing in the humanities and social sci-
ences. […] We also share a willingness to subject some of our most established schol-
arly communication practices to creative critique, together with the institutions that 
sustain them (the university, the library, the publishing house and so on). The collec-
tive thus offers a radical ‘alternative’ to the conservative versions of open access that 
are currently being put forward by commercially-oriented presses, funders and policy 
makers. […] By showcasing the wide variety of non-commercial, not-for-profit and/
or commons-based models for the creation and dissemination of academic knowl-
edge that are currently available, we endeavour to help generate and sustain diversity 
within the publishing ecology. (Radical Open Access, n.d.)
The question that remains to be answered is if and how the public service Internet projects 
and the digital commons can contribute to advancing digital democracy. The conclusion 
addresses this issue.
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Conclusion: Advancing digital democracy
The digital public sphere is a dimension of the public sphere, where published knowledge 
takes on digital formats and informs critical public debate. For Habermas, the public sphere 
has a democratic, non-capitalist and unideological character. Therefore, not all digital knowl-
edge and not all digital communication is part of the public sphere. Public service media 
are media that are publicly owned by independent not-for-profit organisations that are not 
controlled but enabled by the state and operate a basic public service remit to provide con-
tent and services that advance democratic communication, education, and culture. Public 
service Internet platforms are Internet platforms owned, operated and maintained by public 
service media. Just like public service media, public service Internet platforms are media of, 
in, and operated through the public sphere. Digital civil society projects such as diamond 
open access platforms and platform cooperatives are not-for-profit digital projects that are 
commonly owned and governed by the workers who produce the resources underpinning 
these projects. Public service Internet platforms and digital civil society/community media 
platforms are both part of the public sphere and the digital public sphere. Their main differ-
ence is that the organisation operating, controlling, and owning the platform is in the first 
case a public service media organisation and a civil society group or community in the second 
case. Public service Internet platforms operate closer to the state than platform cooperatives 
and other digital civil society projects. Public service Internet platforms are, however, not 
controlled, but rather enabled by the state.
Table 4 outlines some foundations of three political economies of digital platforms. Public 
service Internet platforms and civil society Internet platforms are the two types of digital 
platforms that operate on non-capitalist principles and thereby negative the political econ-
omy of digital capitalism. They operate in the digital public sphere. In contrast, capitalist 
digital platforms colonise, feudalise, alienate, and destroy the digital public sphere. Public 
service Internet platforms and civil society Internet platforms are excellent foundations for 
advancing the digital commons, i.e. digital environmental sustainability (natural digital com-
mons), digital socialism (economic digital commons), participatory digital democracy (politi-
cal digital commons), and digital friendships (the cultural digital commons). Creating such 
non-capitalist digital platforms is not a sufficient condition for the advancement of the digital 
Table 4: Three political economies of digital platforms.
Dimension Capitalist Internet 
platforms
Public service Internet 
platforms
Civil society Internet 
platforms, digital 
 community media
economy digital capital, private own-
ership of digital platforms 
that accumulate capital
public service organisation community ownership, 
civil society organisation 
ownership, cooperatives
politics governance by private 
owners, shareholders and 
managers
governance by a democrati-
cally legitimated board
governance by the com-
munity of members/
workers/users
culture publicly available digital 
content that is prone to 
ideology and capitalist 
values
digital content and digital 
services that realise the public 
service remits of democratic 
communication, education, 
culture, and participation
digital content and 
services that support 
user-generation, citizen 
journalism, and digital 
participation
Source: Further development based on: Fuchs (2021, table 8.2).
Fuchs: The Digital Commons and the Digital Public Sphere22
commons, but a good foundation that has a better likelihood and chance to advance digital 
democracy, digital equality, and digital justice than digital capitalism and capitalist digital 
platforms. It takes a conscious human effort, social struggle, and material foundations to 
advance all dimensions of the digital commons. For example, a digital platform can be dem-
ocratically governed and owned (political and economic) but advance e-waste and climate 
change. The organisations and communities operating these platforms should therefore sup-
port the creation of non-capitalist green computing.
Political colonisation is the main danger that public service Internet projects face. Public 
service media lose their independence and critical character when governments are able 
to directly influence the appointment of boards, the hiring and firing of workers, and the 
produced content. Such media are state-controlled media, not public service media. Just like 
traditional public service media, public service Internet projects face the danger of political 
colonisation. Marginalisation and neoliberalisation are the two main dangers that civil soci-
ety Internet platforms such as platform cooperatives face. The history of alternative and com-
munity media is a history of resource precarity and self-exploitative, precarious, voluntary 
labour. Resource precarity and precarious labour are the two twin political–economic dan-
gers that alternative, community projects face. In addition, digital culture is highly shaped 
by a culture of individualism and neoliberal entrepreneurialism. The two main dangers that 
platform cooperatives face is that (1) they remain fair and democratic but small, precarious 
and unimportant, which can be their ruin, and (2) they turn into capitalist projects.
Nick Srnicek (2017: 127) argues that ‘all the traditional problems of co-ops (e.g. the necessity 
of self-exploitation under capitalist social relations) are made even worse by the monopolistic 
nature of platforms, the dominance of network effects, and the vast resources behind these 
companies’ (Srnicek, 2017: 127). Marisol Sandoval (2020) analyses how platform coopera-
tives have employed the neoliberal language of entrepreneurship (‘creators’, ‘entrepreneur’, 
‘innovation’, ‘investments’, ‘shareholders’, ‘profits’, ‘shares’, etc.) and how such a focus has 
advanced individualism and undermined cooperatives’ potential for radical politics. ‘But col-
lective ownership and democratic governance do not automatically protect co-ops from the 
dynamics of entrepreneurialism’ (Sandoval, 2020: 811).
The main danger that public service Internet platforms and platform cooperatives face is 
that they are paralysed or destroyed by contradictions that stem from economic, political, or 
ideological colonisation, so that they cannot challenge and oppose the power of capitalist 
Internet platforms. Advancing an alternative Internet can therefore only be successful if it 
is part of a broader political movement and campaign for strengthening the public sphere 
and the commons in society. Advancing the digital public sphere, the digital commons, and 
digital democracy requires progressive politics that address issues such as the following ones:
1. Techno-realism: Progressive digital politics should avoid both techno-optimism and 
techno-pessimism and advance realistic projects and platforms that are possible, feasible, 
challenge and oppose, and point beyond digital capitalism.
2. Advancing digital democracy, the digital public sphere, and the digital commons should 
be part and parcel of movements, parties, and movement parties that campaign for the 
strengthening of democracy, the public sphere, and the commons in general. 
Advancing the common control of the means of communication requires the advance-
ment of the common good and the commons in society in general.
3. Advancing digital democracy, the digital public sphere, and the digital commons is not 
a technical question but a question of bringing about good working conditions for 
digital and communication workers (and workers in general) and a good life for all in 
digital society.
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4. Progressive digital politics needs to stand up for the breakup of capitalist monopolies 
in the communication, media, and digital sector in particular and in the economy in 
general.
5. Progressive digital politics should demand and advance ending corporate tax havens, 
corporate tax avoidance, and low corporation taxes. It should campaign for and imple-
ment higher corporate tax rates in general and, in particular, a digital services tax that 
affects large transnational capitalist media and digital companies.
6. Digital democracy, the digital public sphere, and the digital commons need space, 
time, material support, and public/civil society partnerships. Material support 
helps creating such space and time. Corporation taxes and a media fee paid not just by 
citizens, but also by companies, can create a material support for alternative projects. 
The licence fee should be kept where it exists and introduced where it does not yet 
exist and be used for funding public service media and public service Internet projects. 
The licence fee should be extended from households to corporations and be developed 
from a flat fee into a progressive fee. Participatory budgeting can be combined with 
corporation taxes in order to create a public sphere cheque that citizens receive in order 
to support alternative, democratic public sphere and civil society projects. Instead of 
public/private partnerships, public/civil society partnerships are needed where public 
organisations cooperate with civil society organisations. Where possible and feasible, 
there should be partnerships of public service Internet projects and civil society Internet 
projects. Using such forms of material support, public service Internet projects and civil 
society Internet projects, and networks of public service and civil society organisations 
should create Internet platforms of, for, and through the public sphere that advance 
the digital commons and follow the remit of advancing democracy, education, culture, 
and participation in society with the help of digital technologies. Such public, civil, 
and public/civil Internet platforms challenge capitalist Internet platforms and thereby 
 digital capitalism.
7. Digital, critical, and democratic skills: Digital democracy requires critical, engaged 
 citizens who practise democratic debate and democracy. Citizens require time, spaces, 
educational opportunities, and participation opportunities in order to develop and 
practice democratic, digital, political, social, cultural, and other skills. On the one hand, 
participation and engagement with others is education on participation. On the other 
hand, measures such as the reduction in working hours with full wage compensation, 
the introduction of a redistributive basic income guarantee funded by capital taxation, 
political and digital education in schools and an offensive in adult learning based on the 
principles of critical pedagogy, etc. are material measures that provide foundations and 
support for skills development. Progressive digital politics should advance critical educa-
tion opportunities.
8. Deceleration, slow media: The public sphere needs time for critical thinking, read-
ing, critical writing, critical presentation, critical debating, critical coproduction. Digital 
media can support such processes that bind online practices and face-to-face practices. 
Digital platforms should be designed in such a way that they enable humans to afford 
sufficient time for the critical skills just mentioned.
9. Privacy friendliness and data minimisation: Non-capitalist digital media should 
respect the privacy of citizens, workers, and consumer. They should use the principle of 
privacy by design, minimise data storage to data that is needed for operating platforms, 
and be advertising free.
10. Public service Internet platforms and civil society Internet platforms as well as their 
users should respect and advance democracy, plurality of opinions that respects 
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human rights and the equality of all humans, anti-classism, anti-racism, gender equal-
ity, anti-fascism, and inclusion. Advancing participation should not be a fig leave for 
enabling fascist, racist, and other hate speech. News and educational programmes 
require high quality standards and should always be truthful. There is no place for 
false news and post-truth politics in progressive media. Those who hold discrimina-
tory views should be allowed to speak as long as they do not violate laws (e.g. when 
voicing death threats or violent threats), but their views should always be adequately 
challenged.
Today, digital society is a digital capitalism that undermines democracy, the public sphere, 
and the common good. Progressive digital politics that advance the digital public sphere and 
the digital commons along with the public sphere, public services, and the common in gen-
eral are the active and practical hope for safeguarding and advancing democracy in the age 
of, and in opposition to, digital authoritarianism.
Note
 1 Global GDP 2019: US$ 33.426 trillion. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
CD (last accessed 7 October 2020).
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